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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS
CURIAE
The interest of amicus curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law
and Equality1 is set forth in the accompanying Motion for Leave to File.
INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should interpret Washington’s due process clause to
afford children in dependency proceedings the right to counsel. The Court
may reach this conclusion in two distinct ways. First, the Court should
decide that article I, section 3 affords children such a right, without
conducting an analysis under State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d
808 (1986). Because Gunwall’s sole purpose is to help courts determine
whether the state constitution affords greater protection than the federal
constitution, Gunwall is unnecessary where, as here, there is no federal
law establishing whether children have a right to counsel in dependency
proceedings. Furthermore, it is well established that the Washington
constitution guarantees parents a right to counsel in terminations and
dependency proceedings. In re the Welfare of Luscier, 84 Wn.2d 135, 13738, 524 P.2d 906 (1974); In re the Welfare of Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252,
254-55, 533 P.2d 841 (1975). Because a child’s liberty interests at stake in

1

The Korematsu Center thanks Darrah Hinton, class of 2017 at Seattle
University School of Law, for her contributions to this brief.
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a dependency proceeding are at least as great as those of the parents, this
Court should similarly conclude that article I, section 3 entitles children to
counsel in this context.
Second, should this Court decide that a Gunwall analysis is
necessary, the Court should use the Gunwall analysis as an interpretive
guide to ensure principled development of state constitutional law. When
properly contextualized in the myriad other protections afforded to
children in dependency proceedings by preexisting statutory and common
law, as well as our Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the right to
counsel under article I, section 3, providing children in dependencies the
right to counsel is a meaningful next step in Washington’s deep tradition
of providing robust protection to children.
ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD HOLD WITHOUT CONDUCTING
A GUNWALL ANALYSIS THAT ARTICLE I, SECTION 3
GUARANTEES CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
a. For Matters of First Impression, Washington Courts
Interpret and Apply the Washington Constitution Before
the Federal, an Approach that Fosters Robust Development
of State Constitutional Law.
As our Supreme Court articulated in State v. Coe, Washington

courts “will first independently interpret and apply the Washington
constitution in order, among other concerns, to develop a body of
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independent jurisprudence, and because consideration of the United States
Constitution first would be premature.” 101 Wn.2d 364, 374, 679 P.2d 353
(1984). The different histories and purposes of the state and federal
constitutions “clearly demonstrate that the protection of the fundamental
rights of Washington citizens was intended to be and remains a separate
and important function of our state constitution and courts that is closely
associated with our sovereignty.” Id. “When a state court neglects its duty
to evaluate and apply its state constitution, it deprives the people of their
‘double security.’” Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 96 Wn.2d
230, 238, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) (quoting The Federalist No. 51, at 339
(Modern Library ed. 1937) (A. Hamilton or J. Madison)); see also State v.
Smith, 117 Wn.2d 263, 283, 814 P.2d 652 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring)
(observing that “[s]tate constitutions were originally intended to be the
primary devices to protect individual rights.”).
This case requires this Court to turn to the state constitution to
protect individual rights, and in so doing, continue to “develop a body of
independent jurisprudence.” State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431, 443, 909
P.2d 293 (1996).
b. In Interpreting the Washington Constitution, a Gunwall
Analysis Is Not Appropriate Where, as Here, There Is No
Federal Law on Point.
Amicus agrees with appellants that no Gunwall analysis is needed

3

to determine whether children have a due process right to counsel in
dependency proceedings under article I, section 3. A Gunwall analysis is a
comparative tool, designed to guide Washington courts in a principled
analysis of whether a particular constitutional provision is coextensive
with its federal counterpart or instead affords heightened protection.
Because Gunwall’s entire purpose is a comparative tool, as stated
repeatedly in Gunwall and reinforced by subsequent cases, a Gunwall
analysis is wholly inappropriate for the matter at hand, where there is no
federal jurisprudence on point.
In Gunwall, the court’s analysis centered on a concern for
respecting on-point precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court. It began by
acknowledging that while states have the “sovereign right” to provide
“more expansive” rights under their state constitutions than under the
federal, state constitutional decisions that “establish no principled basis for
repudiating federal precedent” are problematic. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at
59-60 (emphasis added). It spoke of the need for “consistency and
uniformity between the state and federal governments” by having state
courts be “sensitive to developments in federal law,” and by looking to
U.S. Supreme Court decisions as “important guides on the subjects which
they squarely address.” Id. at 60-61 (citing State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 363,
450 A.2d 952 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring) (emphasis added)). It
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concluded that the six nonexclusive factors would help ensure that the
Court would not be “merely substituting [its] notion of justice for that of
duly elected legislative bodies or the United States Supreme Court.” Id. at
63. It follows that where there is no federal precedent on point, the
concerns that motivated Gunwall are absent.
Subsequent decisions reinforced Gunwall’s purpose by focusing on
whether the Washington constitution provides “greater” or “different”
protection than under the U.S. Constitution. For instance, in State v.
Foster, our Supreme Court explicitly recognized that a Gunwall analysis is
necessary only when there is federal law on point. 135 Wn.2d 441, 455,
957 P.2d 712 (1998). In conducting its Gunwall analysis of the state’s
confrontation clause (which had been previously held to be coextensive in
other confrontation contexts), the court first looked to federal court
interpretations of the Sixth Amendment because “we must first understand
the breadth of that right before we can determine whether our state
confrontation clause provides greater protection to an accused than does
the federal confrontation clause.” Id. (citing State v. Rainford, 86 Wn.
App. 431, 436, 936 P.2d 1210 (1997)); see also City of Woodinville v.
Northshore United Church of Christ, 166 Wn.2d 633, 641, 211 P.3d 406
(2009) (“[Gunwall] articulates standards to determine when and how
Washington’s constitution provides different protection of rights than the
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United States Constitution” (emphasis added)); State v. Martin, 151 Wn.
App. 98, 105, 210 P.3d 345 (2009) (analysis of federal Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence was necessary to conduct first, in order to “illuminat[e] the
issues arising in a Gunwall analysis of article I, section 22.”). By
definition, such a comparative analysis loses its meaning where there is no
federal precedent “squarely” on point, Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 60, because
there is nothing against which to compare. In these situations, the Gunwall
test is inappropriate to use.2
The only question remaining, then, is whether the U.S. Supreme
Court has addressed children’s right to counsel in dependency
proceedings, and it clearly has not. It is undeniable that while the U.S.
Supreme Court has considered parents’ rights in the termination context,
it has never considered children’s rights to counsel within the dependency
context. In re Dependency of M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d 1, 15, 271 P.3d 234
(2012), is instructive on this issue. There, our Supreme Court considered
whether children had a right to counsel in termination of parental rights

2

In Andersen v. King Cty., 158 Wn.2d 1, 43, 138 P.3d 963 (2006), the court
commented in a footnote, “Whether a Gunwall analysis is required does not depend on
whether there is dispositive federal law.” Id. at 43 n.18. However, the plaintiffs made
only a single conclusive statement, without support or reasoning, that Gunwall should not
apply due to the absence of dispositive federal law. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at
18, Andersen v. King Cty., 158 Wn.2d 1 (No. 75934-1) (2004 WL 3155214). City of
Woodinville, 166 Wn.2d 633, is more recent than Andersen and is more thoroughly
reasoned, and the comparative methodology set out there and in Foster contradicts the
position summarily expressed in Andersen without explanation or citation to authority.
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cases, but confined its analysis to the federal constitution only. However,
even as to just the federal constitution, the court acknowledged the
framework laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 31-32,
101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981), was only “instructive” and not
binding, since Lassiter concerned the rights of parents and not children.
M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d at 15; see also Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 43 n.10
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The possibility of providing counsel for the
child at the termination proceeding has not been raised by the parties. That
prospect requires consideration of interests different from those presented
here, and again might yield a different result with respect to right to
counsel.”).3 Here, because no federal law exists regarding children’s right
to counsel in dependency proceedings, a comparison is not only
unnecessary, it is impossible.
While there is no federal constitutional precedent on point,
rendering Gunwall a nullity, this Court can be guided by the

3

The issue counsel for children in termination proceedings was not before the
Court in Lassiter, as North Carolina statutorily guarantees state-provided counsel for
children. 452 U.S. at 28 (citing N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7A–289.29 (Supp.1979)). In the one case
where the Supreme Court has analyzed the right to counsel for children, it recognized
such a right. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) (in
juvenile delinquency context, reasoning “[t]he juvenile needs…counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the
proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.”).
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pronouncements of our Supreme Court as to state constitutional precedent
on similar matters. Article I, section 3 guarantees counsel for parents in
termination and dependency proceedings, due to the possibility of
deprivation of physical liberty and of the fundamental right to the parentchild relationship. Luscier, 84 Wn.2d at 138; Myricks, 85 Wn.2d at 841.
While these cases preceded Gunwall, the court has suggested several times
that the cases retain their vitality. See, e.g., King v. King, 162 Wn.2d 378,
383 n.3, 174 P.3d 659 (2007) (“We note that Luscier and Myricks were
favorably cited more recently in our case, In re Dependency of Grove.”).
Both doctrinally and logically, it follows that because parents are
guaranteed counsel in termination and dependency proceedings, so too
should children be guaranteed counsel in dependency proceedings, where
both physical liberty and fundamental liberties are at stake.
II.

ALTERNATIVELY, IF A GUNWALL ANALYSIS IS
DEEMED NECESSARY NOTWITHSTANDING THE
ABSENCE OF FEDERAL LAW ON POINT, THIS COURT
SHOULD USE THE GUNWALL FACTORS AS
INTERPRETIVE GUIDES TO FURTHER PRINCIPLED
DEVELOPMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
a. The Gunwall Analysis Evolved from a Comparative Tool
to Determine Whether to Apply the State Constitution into
an Interpretive Guide for How to Apply the State
Constitution.
State v. Gunwall was responsive to criticism that state courts were

relying on state constitutional provisions to reach results-oriented
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decisions when they simply disagreed with the result dictated by federal
law. The Gunwall court itself criticized state courts for “resorting to state
constitutions rather than to analogous provisions of the United States
Constitution [and] simply announc[ing] that their decision is based on the
state constitution but…not further explain[ing] it.” 106 Wn.2d at 60.4 In
other words, Gunwall was initially a response to our state courts’
uncertainty “about the propriety of applying their constitutions
independently of the U.S. Constitution…judges needed comparative
factors to justify independent analysis.” Robert F. Utter & Hugh D.
Spitzer, The Washington State Constitution 14 (2d ed. 2013).
However, while Gunwall initially functioned as a comparative tool
“for deciding whether to interpret a state provision independently,
[Gunwall] transformed into factors to guide briefing and to aid the court in
determining how much weight to accord U.S. Supreme Court decisions.”
Utter & Spitzer, supra, at 14; see also Hugh Spitzer, New Life for the
“Criteria Tests” in State Constitutional Jurisprudence: “Gunwall Is

4

In the watershed case of State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 690-99, 674 P.2d
1240 (1983), our Supreme Court interpreted article I, section 7 to be more protective than
the Fourth Amendment. Perfectly summarizing the critique to which the Gunwall court
responded, the dissent began by criticizing the majority for “picking and choosing
between state and federal constitutions” to support what was, in the dissent’s view, an
unprincipled decision. Id. at 703 (Dimmick, J., dissenting).
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Dead—Long Live Gunwall!”, 37 Rutgers L.J. 1169, 1178 (2006).5 In fact,
although the court in Gunwall was transparently addressing the criticism
that state courts were, “without adequate explanation, relying on state
constitutions rather than analogous provisions of the U.S. Constitution,”
Utter & Spitzer, supra, at 14, the formal purpose of the factors as stated in
Gunwall is “helping to insure that if this court does use independent state
constitutional grounds in a given situation, it will consider these criteria to
the end that our decision will be made for well founded legal reasons.” Id.
(quoting Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 62).
The key Gunwall cases in the decades following the Gunwall
decision reflect the evolution in overall function from comparative—
assuming there is federal law on point to compare, which, as discussed
above, is absent here—to interpretive. In State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d
466, 472, 755 P.2d 797 (1988), while the court declined to reach the state
constitutional issue on account of inadequate Gunwall briefing, it
nevertheless articulated that the nonexclusive Gunwall criteria aided in

5

The Gunwall factors themselves are a mix of comparative factors, which help
determine whether to apply a state provision differently, and interpretive factors, which
help determine how to apply a particular provision. Spitzer, supra, at 1178. Factor 1 (text
of the state constitution), factor 3 (state constitutional history), factor 4 (preexisting state
law), and factor 6 (matters of particular state and local concern) are interpretive in nature,
whereas factor 2 (differences in the texts of parallel provisions) and factor 5 (structural
differences between federal and state constitutions) are explicitly comparative.
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“developing a sound basis for our state constitutional law,” and
characterized their “use as interpretive principles of our state
constitution.”6 Id. In State v. Gocken, 127 Wn.2d 95, 107, 896 P.2d 1267
(1995), the debate over Gunwall’s function was expressed in stark relief.
In determining whether the state’s double jeopardy clause provided
broader protection than the federal, the majority conducted the Gunwall
analysis to determine whether the state constitution could be invoked, and,
finding the Washington and federal double jeopardy projections to be
coextensive, applied the federal test. Id. at 102. In the concurrence/dissent,
Justice Madsen emphasized that Washington had a “preexisting
independent analysis of double jeopardy” that should have controlled, and
that “Gunwall was merely intended to be a tool in the development of a
principled analysis in cases where an issue is undecided under the state
constitution.” Id. at 110 (Madsen, J., concurring and dissenting). A few
years after Gocken, in State v. White, 135 Wn.2d 761, 769, 958 P.2d 982
(1998), as amended (July 17, 1998), a search case, the court applied article
I, section 7 without a Gunwall analysis. Thus, the court accepted the view

6

While Wethered was “repeatedly used as the basis for blocking access to state
constitutional arguments for lack of adequate Gunwall briefing,” Justice Utter’s intent in
Wethered was to “steer…[the] court toward using the Gunwall criteria as interpretive
tools rather than as a magic key to the walled kingdom of the state constitution.” Spitzer,
supra, at 1180.
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that Gunwall was meant to establish principles of state constitutional
jurisprudence: “[o]nce we agree that our prior cases direct the analysis to
be employed in resolving the legal issue, a Gunwall analysis is no longer
helpful or necessary.” Id.
Gunwall’s interpretive function, and its aim of developing
principled state constitutional jurisprudence, should therefore influence
how this Court approaches the factors. Gunwall helps “both attorneys and
judges systematically analyze a challenging question from a variety of
angles that courts have always used, consciously or unconsciously, to
evaluate cases.” Spitzer, supra, at 1184.
b. Gunwall Factors 4 and 6 Encompass Any Preexisting State
Law that Relates and Gives Context to Washington’s Due
Process Protections in General, as well as to the Specific
Nature of the Rights at Stake.
In light of Gunwall’s utility as a means for principled development
of state constitutional jurisprudence, Amicus urges this Court to analyze
factors 4 and 6 within an appropriately broad contextual frame. Because
the purpose of procedural due process is to protect constitutionally
cognizable rights, a meaningful Gunwall analysis must look not only at the
constitutional provision itself, but also at the nature of the rights said to be
protected by due process. Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. E.S., 171 Wn.2d 695, 71011, 257 P.3d 570 (2011) (stating that “context matters” in a due process
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analysis, and recognizing the context of that case had to be defined by
examining the rights implicated in an initial truancy hearing). Thus, factor
4, which looks at preexisting state law, and factor 6, which asks whether
the matter is of particular state concern, must take into account both due
process in general and, more specifically, children’s liberty interests
implicated in dependency proceedings.7 In fact, our Supreme Court
recognizes that factors 4 and 6 are unique to the context in which the
interpretation arises. Foster, 135 Wn.2d at 461 (citation omitted).8
Factor 4 includes consideration of the myriad ways in which
preexisting state law protects children’s liberty interests, in addition to
preexisting state law analyzing article I, section 3. Factor 6, whether a
matter is of “particular state or local concern,” also appropriately includes
an examination of how Washington has moved towards greater protections
for minors in child welfare cases.
Our Supreme Court has stated that the right to counsel under the
state constitution attaches where “the litigant’s physical liberty is

7

The same would be true for other interpretive factors such as factor 3, which
looks at state constitutional and common law history. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 58.
8
DSHS broadly asserts that “no Washington appellate court applying the
Gunwall factors has ever concluded that article I, section 3 provides greater protection
than the Federal Due Process Clause.” Br. of Resp’t at 12. How courts have interpreted
article I, section 3 in other contexts may or may not be instructive, as it is, by definition, a
procedural protection that differs according to the nature of right at stake. See, e.g.,
Bellevue Sch. Dist., 171 Wn.2d at 711.
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threatened or where a fundamental liberty interest, similar to the parentchild relationship, is at risk.” In re Grove, 127 Wn.2d 221, 237, 897 P.2d
1252 (1995) (emphasis added). Consistent with this statement, as
discussed in Part I.b., supra, our Supreme Court has repeatedly protected
the right to counsel for parents under article I, section 3 in termination
proceedings, due to the physical liberty and fundamental liberty interests
at stake, Luscier, 84 Wn.2d at 138-39, and in dependency proceedings,
due to fundamental liberty interests at stake, Myricks, 85 Wn.2d at 253-55.
And our Supreme Court has stated that dependency proceedings implicate
the child’s physical liberty interests “because the child will be physically
removed from the parent’s home,” it is the child who “become[s] a ward
of the State,” and it is the child that faces “the daunting challenge of
having his or her person put in the custody of the State as a foster child,
powerless and voiceless, to be forced to move from one foster home to
another.” M.S.R., 174 Wn.2d at 16.9 “Foster home placement may result in
multiple changes of homes, schools, and friends over which the child has
no control.” Id. Given that our Supreme Court has determined parents are
entitled to counsel in dependency proceedings, where there are

9

While M.S.R. decided the issue under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96
S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), and not under article I, section 3, 174 Wn.2d at 15-20,
the court’s articulation of the children’s interests at stake in termination and dependency
proceeding is important to consider here.
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fundamental liberty interests but not physical liberty interests at stake, it
follows that article I, section 3 should afford counsel to children in
dependency proceedings, where there are both physical liberty interests
and fundamental interests at stake. See Appellant’s Br. at 7-13.
Such a determination would be consistent with Washington’s
common law that has long championed the welfare of the child in the
deprivation context. As early as the turn of the 20th century, our Supreme
Court recognized the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration
in termination proceedings. Ex Parte Day, 189 Wash. 368, 382, 65 P.2d
1049 (1937) (“The two principles, then, the welfare of the child and the
right of the parent, must be considered together, the former being the more
weighty.” (emphasis added)); see also State v. Rasch, 24 Wash. 332, 335,
64 P. 531, 533 (1901) (“It is no slight thing to deprive a parent of the care,
custody, and society of a child, or a child of the protection, guidance, and
affection of the parent.”).
Further, our Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
appointed counsel for children, as counsel provides different and greater
protection than a guardian ad litem. In In re Parentage of L.B., 155 Wn.2d
679, 712 n.29, 122 P.3d 161 (2005), amicus argued, like Amicus does
here, that the child should have appointed counsel. Because none of the
parties had raised the issue, the court declined to address it. Id.

15

Importantly, however, the court “urge[d] trial courts…to consider the
interests of children in dependency [and] parentage…proceedings, and
whether appointing counsel, in addition to and separate from the
appointment of a GAL, to act on their behalf and represent their interests
would be … in the interests of justice.” Id. (citing RCW 13.34.100(6);
RCW 26.09.110; King County LFLR 13) (emphasis added). The court
noted that when “adjudicating the best interests of the child, we
must…remain centrally focused on those whose interests with which we
are concerned, recognizing that not only are they often the most
vulnerable, but also powerless and voiceless.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Additionally, the history of state statutory law provides important
context for this Court’s analysis of factors 4 and 6, as it demonstrates the
legislature’s recognition of the unique role of counsel.10 In its 2010
amendments to RCW 13.34.100, 13.34.105, and 13.34.215, the legislature
added a new section that specifically found that “inconsistent practices in
and among counties in Washington…resulted in few children being
notified of their right to request legal counsel.” Laws of 2010, ch. 180, § 1.
The legislature’s recognition of the importance of providing counsel to
children in dependencies in fact applies to all dependencies:
10

Gunwall itself explains that state statutes assist in determining what the proper
scope of a constitutional right may be. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d at 61-62.
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Attorneys…have different skills and obligations than guardians ad
litem and court-appointed special advocates, especially in forming
a confidential and privileged relationship with a child….Welltrained attorneys can provide legal counsel to a child on issues
such as placement options, visitation rights, educational rights,
access to services while in care and services available to a child
upon aging out of care. Well-trained attorneys for a child can:
(a) Ensure the child’s voice is considered in judicial proceedings;
(b) Engage the child in his or her legal proceedings;
(c) Explain to the child his or her legal rights;
(d) Assist the child, through the attorney's counseling role, to
consider the consequences of different decisions; and
(e) Encourage accountability, when appropriate, among the
different systems that provide services to children.
Id. The 2010 amendments also require that both the state and the guardian
ad litem notify a child of twelve years old or older of the right to request
an attorney, and further requires the state and the guardian ad litem to ask
the child whether he or she wishes an attorney. Laws of 2010, ch. 180, § 2.
Then, in 2014, the legislature again amended RCW 13.34.100.
Laws of 2014, ch. 108, § 2. The amendments established a right to counsel
for dependent children where there is no parent remaining with parental
rights. Id. The amendments also permit judges to appoint counsel to
children in any dependency action, either sua sponte or “upon the request
of a parent, the child, a guardian ad litem, a caregiver, or the department.”
Id. This increased protectiveness of the right to counsel militates strongly
in favor of independent interpretation.
Finally, the treatment in Washington of the right of criminal
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defendants to confront witnesses provides an illustrative contrast to the
treatment of the right to counsel, demonstrating both why preexisting law
supports independent interpretation of the right to counsel under article I,
section 3, and why the right to counsel is a matter of state concern. In
State v. Foster, 135 Wn.2d 441, the court observed that over time,
Washington statutory and case law had carved out more and more
exceptions to the right for a defendant to confront witnesses, which cut
against independent analysis under the state constitution. Id. at 463-65 (“In
recent years, the exceptions to the right have been enlarged….Preexisting
law does not support an independent analysis of our state confrontation
clause in the context of the present case.”). Conversely, while federal law
does not recognize a right to counsel for parents or children, Washington
law has expanded to recognize a right to counsel for parents both
statutorily (RCW 13.34.090(2)) and constitutionally (Luscier, 84 Wn.2d
135; Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252), and as discussed above, the legislature has
expanded the reach of RCW 13.34.100 over time.
In sum, factors 4 and 6 support independent analysis as set forth
above by Amicus and by S.K-P., Br. of Appellant at 24-28 (factor 4), 2829 (factor 6), and factors 2, 3, and 5 support an independent state
constitution analysis as well, as set forth by S.K-P., Br. of Appellant at 21
(factor 2), 21-24 (factor 3), 28 (factor 5).
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c. Pre-Gunwall Decisions Provide Public Policy Rationales
for Interpreting Article I, Section 3 as Providing Greater
Protection than Federal Due Process.
The Gunwall court made clear that the six factors are
“nonexclusive.” 106 Wn.2d at 58. This Court can and therefore should
consider Washington’s due process jurisprudence prior to Gunwall. In
State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984), and State v.
Davis, 38 Wn. App. 600, 686 P.2d 1143 (1984), our courts held that article
I, section 3 mandated greater protection than federal due process.
In Bartholomew, our Supreme Court held that article I, section 3
was offended by Washington’s death penalty statute, which permitted the
jury in the sentencing phase to consider any evidence, even if the evidence
was inadmissible under the rules of evidence. 101 Wn.2d at 640. The
Court reasoned that article I, section 3 would not tolerate a statute that
provided lesser protection to those facing a capital sentence, and that the
statute was “contrary to the reliability of evidence standard embodied in
the due process clause of our state constitution.” Id. at 640-41. The Court
noted that even if its analysis were incorrect under federal law, its
interpretation of article I, section 3 was not constrained by the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 639.
In Davis, Division I of this Court held that use of a juvenile
defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment, regardless of whether the
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silence followed Miranda warnings, was fundamentally unfair and
violated article I, section 3. 38 Wn. App. at 605. Federal law allowed the
use of a defendant’s post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes if the
defendant had not received Miranda warnings. Id. at 604-05 (citing
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S. Ct. 1309, 71 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1982)).
The court declined to follow federal law, reasoning that limiting the
exclusion of post-arrest silence to instances where Miranda warnings are
given would penalize a defendant who had not been advised of his rights.
Id. As a matter of public policy, the court was concerned that following
Fletcher “might also encourage police to delay reading Miranda warnings
or to dispense with them altogether to preserve the opportunity to use the
defendant’s silence against him.” Id. at 605.
Although these cases predate Gunwall, they demonstrate courts
relying on policy rationales to extend heightened due process protections.
For a discussion of the compelling policy rationales for children’s right to
counsel in dependency proceedings, see Br. of Appellant at 42-48
(describing importance of uniformity and practical courtroom barriers).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in S.K-P.’s briefing and above, the
Korematsu Center urges this Court to interpret article I, section 3 to
guarantee counsel for children in dependencies.
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